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Abstract 
Questions of how we know our own and other minds, and whether metacognition and 
mindreading rely on the same processes, are longstanding in psychology and philosophy. In 
Experiment 1, children/adolescents with autism (who tend to show attenuated mindreading) 
showed significantly lower accuracy on an explicit metacognition task than neurotypical 
children/adolescents, but not on an allegedly metacognitive implicit one.  In Experiment 2, 
neurotypical adults completed these tasks in a single-task condition, or a dual-task condition 
that required concurrent completion of a secondary task that tapped mindreading.   
Metacognitive accuracy was significantly diminished by the dual-mindreading-task on the 
explicit task, but not the implicit task. In Experiment 3, we included additional dual-tasks to 
rule out the possibility that any secondary task (regardless of whether it required mindreading) 
would diminish metacognitive accuracy.  Finally, in both experiments 1 and 2, metacognitive 
accuracy on the explicit task, but not the implicit task, was associated significantly with 
performance on a measure of mindreading ability.  These results suggest that explicit 
metacognitive tasks (used frequently to measure metacognition in humans) share 
metarepresentational processing resources with mindreading, whereas implicit tasks (which are 
claimed by some comparative psychologists to measure metacognition in non-human animals) 
do not.    
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Linking Metacognition and Mindreading: Evidence from Autism and Dual-task 
Investigations 
Questions of how we know our own minds, how we know other minds, and whether 
non-human animals are capable of such self- or other-awareness, have proven to be some of 
the most enduring and important in the history of psychology and philosophy. The experiments 
described here were designed to throw light on both sets of questions at once. We begin by 
discussing the relationship between self-knowledge and other-knowledge in humans. 
Metacognition (metarepresentation of one’s own mental states) is considered essential 
for day-to-day behavioral functioning, because it is this monitoring of one’s internal states that 
allows one to regulate those states (Nelson & Leonesio, 1988). Mindreading 
(metarepresentation of others’ mental states; sometimes referred to as “theory of mind”) is 
likewise important for almost all domains of human social life, and when it is diminished most 
aspects of social life suffer. For example, autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a developmental 
disorder diagnosed on the basis of significant impairments in social-communication and 
behavioral flexibility (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), and is characterized 
unambiguously by diminished mindreading ability (e.g., Happé, 1995). Thus, the clinical 
significance of understanding the relationship between mindreading and metacognition is high. 
A number of opposing theories have been proposed, offering differing accounts of the 
relation between these two important abilities. For example, some have thought that 
mindreading develops ontogenetically and phylogenetically from an existing metacognitive 
system along with additional imagination/mental simulation abilities (Metacognition-is-prior 
theory; e.g. Goldman, 2006).  Others have claimed that metacognition and mindreading rely 
on entirely distinct systems (Two-systems theory; e.g., Nichols & Stich, 2003). And yet others 
have argued that both involve a single metarepresentational system that processes both the 
mental states of self and of others (One-system theory; e.g., Carruthers, 2009, 2011). Crucially 
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each of these theoretical accounts provides differing predictions for how these abilities might 
relate to each other experimentally. In the current investigation, we tackled these issues using 
complementary approaches in three experiments.   
Before getting to the experiments, however, something further should be said about 
what the talk of “systems” here amounts to. Consider the one-system view first. This holds that 
there is a single core competence—involving a common set of conceptual resources and 
implicating the same mindreading network in the brain—underlying both our attributions of 
mental states to other people and to ourselves. While many of the inputs to the system may 
differ across the two cases (for example, including one’s own inner speech, bodily feelings, 
and visual imagery in the first-person case only), essentially the same cognitive and inferential 
resources are involved in processing those inputs. In the version proposed and defended by 
Carruthers (2011), moreover, the system evolved in the first instance for third-person social 
purposes. Self-awareness results from turning that third-person system on the self. 
In contrast, the two-systems view maintains that there are distinct and dissociable 
networks in the brain responsible for attributing mental states to other people and to oneself, 
though it can be left open whether or not the two systems draw upon the same set of conceptual 
resources (Nichols & Stich, 2003). Hence one’s capacities to draw inferences about the mental 
states of others can be damaged or interfered with without damaging or interfering with one’s 
ability to attribute mental states to oneself, and vice versa. This view can remain neutral on the 
question of the evolutionary emergence of the two capacities. 
Finally, the metacognition-is-prior account maintains that attributing mental states to 
other people implicates a prior ability to attribute those states to oneself. It is by first being 
aware of one’s own mental states, and then projecting such states to other people using one’s 
imaginative or simulative abilities, that one comes to understand the minds of others. On this 
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view, there will be a common set of conceptual abilities involved in both self-attribution and 
other attribution, but the cognitive and inferential resources required for the latter will go well 
beyond what are needed for self-awareness (Goldman, 2006). A prediction of the view, then, 
is that mindreading abilities can be lost or interfered with without losing or interfering with 
metacognitive ones; but any task that interferes with the metacognitive component of 
mindreading will thereby interfere with the latter also. This view is often understood to go 
along with the claim that metacognitive abilities emerged in phylogeny prior to mindreading 
ones.   
Turning, now, to our experiments, in Experiment 1 (case-control experiment), we tested 
metacognition (using a classic “judgement of confidence” paradigm) and mindreading in 
children and adolescents with ASD, as well as in age- and IQ-matched neurotypical (NT) 
comparison participants.  We know that ASD tends to involve a mindreading impairment, so 
if the one-system theory is correct, then participants with ASD should also manifest difficulties 
with metacognition.  In contrast, both metacognition-is-prior and two-systems theorists have 
predicted explicitly that metacognition will be unimpaired in ASD, claiming that autism will 
reveal a crucial dissociation between metacognition and mindreading that would support their 
theories (Goldman, 2006; Nichols & Stich, 2003; Raffman, 1999; Wojcik, Waterman, Lestie, 
Moulin, & Souchay, 2014).  
As we have just noted, actual proponents of the metacognition-is-prior view have 
predicted that metacognition will be unimpaired in ASD. This is because they have thought 
that the impairment in mindreading in ASD is likely to result from the known difficulties such 
people have with imagining and pretending, and because they think that mindreading results 
from a combination of metacognition with imagination, or simulation (Goldman, 2006). But 
such a position isn’t mandatory for a metacognition-is-prior theorist. It could be maintained 
instead that the difficulties with mindreading in ASD result from an underlying metacognitive 
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deficit. In that case, this view, too, would predict that metacognitive abilities will be impaired 
in autism. This form of metacognition-is-prior view is not directly tested in the experiments 
that follow. But notice that if we succeed in showing (both here and in Nicholson et al., 2019) 
that the tests of metacognition employed with monkeys are not genuinely metacognitive in 
nature, then one significant strand of support (as detailed below) for all metacognition-is-prior 
views will have been undermined. In what follows, when we refer to the metacognition-is-prior 
theory we intend just the version defended by Goldman (2006), which predicts intact 
metacognition in ASD. 
In Experiment 2 (dual-task experiment), instead of studying metacognition in a 
population with existing mindreading difficulties we tried to, in a sense, induce mindreading 
difficulties in neurotypical people by using a dual-task paradigm.  In a dual-task paradigm, 
participants complete a primary task either alone (single-task condition) or concurrently with 
a secondary task (dual-task condition).  If the primary and secondary tasks share processing 
resources, then primary task performance will be significantly poorer in the dual-task condition 
than in the single-task condition, because both tasks are competing for a limited resource.  In 
Experiment 2, neurotypical adults completed metacognition tasks either alone or alongside a 
secondary task that tapped mindreading.  If metacognition depends on the same 
metarepresentational resources as mindreading, then metacognition should be significantly 
poorer in the dual-task condition. The two-systems view, at any rate, makes no such prediction. 
We turn now to the question of whether non-human animals are aware of their own and 
other minds. It turns out that this is directly related to the question of whether metacognition 
depends on the same metarepresentational resources as mindreading.  Some theorists have 
suggested that some species of non-human primates (macaques, in particular) are capable of 
metarepresenting their own epistemic mental states, despite apparently lacking the equivalent 
ability to metarepresent the epistemic mental states of conspecifics (Beran, Smith, Coutinho, 
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Couchman, & Boomer, 2009; Martin & Santos, 2014; Smith, Beran, Couchman, & Coutinho, 
2008; Smith, Couchman, & Beran, 2014; Son & Kornell; 2005).  If this interpretation of the 
data is correct, then these findings challenge the one-system view, but are in keeping with both 
other views.  
However, some have argued that the tasks used to assess metacognition in non-human 
primates are not truly metacognitive (do not require metarepresentation of self), claiming that 
they can be successfully completed using first-order, non-metacognitive, processes, rather than 
second-order, genuinely metacognitive, processes (Carruthers, 2011). That is, it has been said 
that instead of monitoring their own states of certainty or uncertainty, as most comparative 
psychologists assume (a second-order, metacognitive, process), the animals can succeed in 
these tasks through first-order (cognitive rather than metacognitive) kinds of risk-evaluation 
(Carruthers & Ritchie, 2012). 
In the current study we set out to test these competing interpretations of the animal data, 
too. We were able to do so, because if humans solve the sorts of task conducted with monkeys 
without employing metacognition, then this provides at least a “proof of concept” that the 
monkeys are doing so too. We therefore employed a version of the “gambling task” introduced 
by Son and Kornell (2005), which has been used to assess metacognition in non-human 
primates (Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 2007).  This task is in many respects structurally equivalent 
to the classic judgement-of-confidence task used to measure metacognition in humans (and 
which we also use in the current study).  Strictly speaking, however, the gambling task 
measures the degree to which strategic behavioural responses are accurate (rather than the 
extent to which verbal metacognitive judgements are accurate, as in the explicit judgement-of-
confidence task). In what follows, we refer to the gambling task as “the implicit task” (because 
it is, putatively, implicitly metacognitive in nature) and the judgement-of-confidence task as 
“the explicit task” (because it requires participants to reflect explicitly on their own internal 
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states and provide a verbal response). 
In the task employed with monkeys by Kornell et al. (2007), the animals were first 
required to make a primary discrimination of some sort (e.g. judging the longest of a set of 
lines) before being asked to place a “bet” on the correctness of that choice. Having made their 
initial discrimination, they could either select a “high risk” symbol that would issue in a large 
reward if they had made the correct choice and a large loss if they had got it wrong, or they 
could select a “low risk” symbol that gave small payoffs or penalties. According to the authors, 
the monkeys solve this task by monitoring their uncertainty about the correctness of their initial 
choice, gambling or declining to gamble accordingly. The task is thus thought to demonstrate 
the presence of metacognitive processes in these animals. 
An alternative, non-metacognitive, interpretation of the data is also possible, however. 
For we know that easy tasks are ones that are performed fluently, and fluency is known to give 
rise to positive valence, whereas disfluent tasks cause negative valence (Casasanto & 
Chrysikou, 2011; Carr, Rotteveel, & Winkielman, 2016). So a primary discrimination task that 
is executed fluently will result in a state of positive affect, which is known in humans to 
increase risk-taking (Gasper & Clore, 2000). Hence the high-risk option will seem good to 
participants following fluent performance. In contrast, disfluent execution will produce 
negative affect, making the high-risk option seem bad. Metarepresentation of self is thus 
unnecessary to produce accurate performance on the gambling task.  
It is worth noticing that processing fluency is among the cues that humans frequently 
use when making explicit metacognitive judgments (Hertzog et al., 2003; Dunlosky & 
Metcalfe, 2009). But, of course, the fact that processing fluency can provide a cue for a 
metacognitive judgment doesn’t mean that processing fluency is itself metacognitive. Ease of 
processing is one thing, awareness that processing is easy is another. Only the latter is 
metacognitive in nature. 
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One of our goals was to discriminate between the two competing explanations of the 
cognitive resources employed in the implicit task (metacognitive or non-metacognitive). For if 
the implicit gambling tasks that have been used with monkeys really do require 
metarepresentation of self, then gambling accuracy should be diminished to the same extent as 
judgement-of-confidence accuracy in a) participants with ASD relative to comparison 
participants in Experiment 1, and b) the dual-task condition relative to the single-task condition 
in Experiment 2 — provided, that is, that metacognition and mindreading share resources, as 
postulated by one-system views and metacognition-is-prior theories.  
A complete set of predictions for both experiments is shown in Table 1 (our own 
predictions are listed in the bottom row). Note that our task design enabled us simultaneously 
to pit the one-system account of the relation between mindreading and metacognition against 
its opponents, as well as pitting first-order against metacognitive interpretations of the implicit 
gambling tasks that have been used with monkeys.  
 
Experiment 1: Method 
Participants  
Twenty-five children/adolescents with ASD and 25 neurotypical (NT) comparison 
children/adolescents took part in the study. All participants completed the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale for Intelligence-II (Wechsler, 1999), which provides verbal, performance, 
and full-scale IQ scores, as well as two widely used measures of mindreading (see details 
below). Mindreading tasks were included to ensure the ASD group was representative of the 
population in showing a mindreading impairment (otherwise the predictions of one-system 
theory could not be tested in this experiment).   
Participants in the ASD group had received verified diagnoses, according to 
conventional criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; World Health Organisation, 
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1992). The parents of all participants completed the Social Responsiveness Scale-II 
(Constantino & Gruber, 2012) to provide an index of number of ASD features/traits manifested 
in participants (T scores of 50 represent the population average; T scores >59 indicate clinically 
significant impairments).  Participant characteristics and group matching statistics are 
presented in Table 2.  All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and none of 
them was color blind. Ethical approval for Experiments 1 and 2 was given by the School of 
Psychology, University of Kent Research Ethics Committee (Ref: 201815281154425026), and 
informed consent was obtained from the parents of all participants and the participants 
themselves.  
 
Materials and Methods 
Mindreading task 1.  The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task (RMIE) (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) is a widely used measure of mindreading in clinical 
and non-clinical populations. Participants completed a child version of the RMIE task (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill, & Lawson, 2001). The child version includes 28 
photographs of the eye-region of the face taken from the adult version of the task. On each 
trial, participants were asked to pick one word from a selection of four to indicate what the 
person in the picture was thinking or feeling. If participants felt more than one of the words 
was applicable, they were instructed to select the word they thought was most suitable. Stimuli 
were presented on screen to participants in a random order, and no time limit was imposed. 
Scores on the RMIE task range from zero to 28, with higher scores indicating better 
performance on the task. The proportion of items correctly identified by ASD and comparison 
participants is shown in Table 2.  
 It should be noted that although the RMIE can be characterized as a kind of empathy 
task, it is also undoubtedly a task that requires mindreading of the mental states of the target 
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agents. For in each case what has to be selected is the most appropriate mental-state descriptor. 
The task has been employed in over 250 studies, and shows good test-retest reliability (e.g., 
Fernández-Abascal, Cabello, Fernández-Berrocal, & Baron-Cohen, 2013), clearly 
distinguishes groups of participants with and without ASD (e.g., Wilson et al., 2014), is 
associated with the number of ASD traits shown by individuals in large population studies 
(e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), and is correlated with other measures of mindreading even 
after the influence of IQ is statistically controlled (e.g., Jones et al., 2018).   
Mindreading task 2.  We employed a version of the Animations Task (Abell, Happé, 
& Frith, 2000) as a second measure of mindreading. The task, which is based on Heider and 
Simmel (1944), required participants to describe interactions between a large red triangle and 
a small blue triangle, as portrayed in a series of silent video clips. Four such clips are apt to 
invoke an explanation of the triangles’ behavior in terms of epistemic mental states, such as 
belief, intention, and deception. These clips comprise the “mentalizing” condition of the task 
and were employed in this study.  
Each clip was presented to participants on a computer screen. After the clip was 
finished, participants described what had happened in the clip. An audio recording of 
participants’ responses was made for later transcription. Each transcript was scored on a scale 
of zero to two for accuracy (including reference to specific mental states), based on the criteria 
outlined in Abell et al. (2000). Eighty percent of transcripts were also scored by two 
independent raters, each of whom was blind to the diagnostic group of the participant and any 
other results from the study. Inter-rater reliability was excellent according to Cicchetti’s (1994) 
criteria (intra-class correlations >.84). Accuracy (proportion) among ASD and comparison 
participants is shown in Table 2.  Note that the Animations Task is a measure of spontaneous 
mental-state attribution. Those who score highly on this measure are spontaneously interpreting 
the movements of the geometric figures in the videos in mental-state terms. Those who score 
12 
 
low on this measure, in contrast, will tend to provide literal (non-mentalistic) descriptions of 
the movements they have observed.   
 Experimental gambling and judgement-of-confidence tasks.  There were two 
experimental tasks (implicit gambling and explicit judgement-of-confidence), both of which 
involved an object-level component that required participants to make perceptual 
discrimination judgements and a (supposed) meta-level component that required them to make 
a judgement or decision about the accuracy of their perceptual discrimination judgement.  It is 
important to note that participants always completed the implicit task before the explicit task 
to avoid transfer of explicit metacognitive strategies from the latter to the former.  The structure 
of the object-level component was identical in each task, but the meta-level component differed 
in each.  Below, we describe first the object-level component that was common to both tasks 
and then the specific procedures of each task individually.   
Object-level perceptual discrimination component.  Two versions of the object-level 
component were created and participants completed one version in the gambling task and the 
other version in the judgement-of-confidence task.   In one version (colour stimuli version), 
stimuli comprised pairs of arrays that varied in shade of blue (from very dark to very light 
blue).  On each trial, participants were presented with two arrays and their task was to select, 
via mouse click, the array displaying the lightest shade of blue.  In the other version (pixel 
stimuli version), stimuli comprised pairs of arrays that varied in pixel density (from very 
densely to very sparsely pixelated).  On each trial, participants were presented with two arrays 
and their task was to select (via mouse click) the array that was most densely pixelated.  In 
each version (colour/pixel), each pair varied in terms of how perceptually similar its members 
were.  The more similar the arrays in each pair were, the more difficult it was to discriminate 
between them.  In each version, there was a range of trial difficulty with some trials involving 
highly similar pairs of arrays and other trials involving highly dissimilar pairs of arrays, along 
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with a wide range in between. Similarity between arrays across trials was determined using a 
random number generator. For pixel trials, the difference in pixel numbers between the two 
arrays was generated using a random number generator with requested outputs of 10-80, based 
on pilot testing to determine average discrimination sensitivity.  For colour trials, variation in 
blue colour between arrays was determined by varying the luminance of each array, in python 
RGB colour space, and was again generated by a random number generator with requested 
outputs of 0.001 to 0.5 (again based on pilot testing to determine average discrimination 
sensitivity). All participants received the same stimuli sets. Task scripts and stimuli parameters 
are published in an open access GitHib repository (https://github.com/cathgrainger/Explicit-
Implicit-JOC-tasks). Importantly, pilot testing was conducted to ensure that the two versions 
(colour/pixel) were of equivalent difficulty, and that object-level perceptual discrimination 
performance was well above chance and but well below ceiling on both.  Half of the 
participants in each group were assigned the colour stimuli version for the implicit (gambling) 
task and the pixel stimuli version for the explicit (judgment-of-confidence) task, and half were 
assigned the pixel stimuli version for the implicit task and the colour stimuli version for the 
explicit task.  All stimuli were presented on a 22-in computer screen.  We now describe the 
specific procedure involved in each task. 
 
Implicit (gambling) task.  The main procedure for the implicit task (object- and “meta” 
components) is illustrated in Figure 1a (note that “meta-” is written in inverted commas here 
to highlight the fact that, while this phase of the task is assumed by some researchers to require 
metacognitive monitoring, we did not believe that it necessarily did).  This task was modelled 
closely on methods that have been employed with non-human animals in previous research.  It 
was explained to participants that they would be shown a series of pairs of patches (arrays) on 
a computer screen that either differed in the number of pixels contained in each member of the 
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pair (if they had been assigned to the pixel stimuli version), or in the shade of blue (if they had 
been assigned to the colour stimuli version).  Accordingly, they were instructed to select the 
patch with the greatest number of pixels or the patch with the lightest blue using the computer 
mouse, and were told that they would have 3s to make each selection.  This was the object-
level component, described in the preceding section.   
The “meta-” level component was subsequently introduced to participants (without 
using any metacognitive language) in the following way.  The experimenter explained that, 
after each of these perceptual discrimination judgments had been made, a new screen would 
appear that displayed a square and a triangle, and that the participant must select one of these 
shapes via mouse click.  Participants were told that they would start with a balance of 50 points, 
and would win or lose points depending on their responses.  They were informed that at the 
end of the task, they had the chance to win a prize depending on how many points they gained 
on the task (in fact, at the end of the experiment, all participants received a prize).  They were 
given written and verbal instructions as follows: 
 
a) If you click on the patch with most pixels (or lightest blue patch, if completing the colour 
version) and choose the triangle, you will win 30 points; 
b) If you click on the patch with most pixels (or lightest blue patch) and choose the circle, you 
will win 10 points; 
c)If you click on the patch with fewest pixels (or deepest blue patch) and choose the triangle, 
you will lose 30 points;  
d) If you click on the patch with fewest pixels (or deepest blue patch) and choose the circle, 
you will lose 10 points.   
 
As such, the triangle represented the “high risk” symbol (large reward if the perceptual 
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discrimination was correct, but large loss if the perceptual discrimination was incorrect) and 
the circle represented the “low risk” symbol (small reward if the perceptual discrimination was 
correct, but small loss if the perceptual discrimination was incorrect).  It is important to stress, 
however, that participants never had the rules described to them in these terms, and great care 
was taken not to use metacognitive language when instructing them.  
After the task had been explained and any requests for clarification had been addressed, 
participants completed 10 practice trials on which their responses did not count toward their 
final points total.  They were asked whether they understood the rules and given a final chance 
to ask for clarification before beginning the actual task, but no further information about the 
nature of the task or the study aims was offered.  At this point they were asked to complete the 
60 experimental trials.  The participant’s running total of points was displayed on the bottom 
left of the computer screen throughout the experiment and updated automatically trial by trial.   
At the end of the implicit task, participants’ memory for the response rules was tested 
by presenting each rule (shown in bullet points a to d above) and asked them to complete the 
points value for each response type.  The difference in the proportion recalled correctly by 
participants with ASD (M = .88, SD = .22) and comparison participants (M = .95, SD = .13) 
was statistically small and non-significant, t = 1.39, p = .17, d = 0.39, BF10 = 0.62 (see the 
section “statistical analysis” for explanations of the statistical tests used). 
Dependant variables for the implicit task were calculated using ‘type 1’ and ‘type 2’ 
signal detection theory. Type 1/ Object-level sensitivity was calculated as d’ (i.e. participant 
ability to discriminate between the two perceptual arrays) and reported in RMS (root mean 
square) units. Object-level response bias (c) was also calculated in RMS units. ‘Type 2’ signal 
detection theory was used to characterize the metacognitive sensitivity of participants’ 
confidence reports to their correct or incorrect judgments, using the meta-d’ statistic (see 
Maniscalco and Lau, 2012, 2014, Fleming & Lau, 2014). Meta-d’ was fit to confidence rating 
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data using a Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) model, implemented in open access 
Python code (please see; http://www.columbia.edu/~bsm2105/type2sdt/). Employing a Meta-
d′ approach allows for metacognitive sensitivity to be compared with object-level decision 
accuracy (‘type 1’ signal detection theory; d′) to provide a relative measure of metacognitive 
efficiency (meta-d′/d′), controlling for object-level task performance. Metacognitive efficiency 
is the key variable of interest in the current study, because it provides a measure of 
metacognitive monitoring accuracy that is unbiased by cognitive-/object-level performance.  In 
order to avoid cell counts of 0 interfering with meta-d’ model fitting, a correction of 0.25 was 
added to each stimuli response count, using the correction formula 1/(2*numRatings), as 
recommended by Maniscalo and Lau (http://www.columbia.edu/~bsm2105/type2sdt/). Finally, 
the degree of participants’ “risk taking” was calculated as the proportion of times the high-risk 
triangle symbol was selected (this can also be thought of as type-2 response bias).   
Explicit (judgement of confidence) task.  The main procedure for the explicit condition 
is illustrated in Figure 1b. The general procedure and points structure were identical to the 
implicit task.  The key difference was that on each trial of the explicit task, after each perceptual 
discrimination judgement, a new screen appeared containing the question, “Are you 
confident?” and the words “yes” or “no”, rather than a square and a triangle.  Participants were 
told that, on each trial, if they felt confident they had chosen the most densely pixelated patch 
(or lightest blue patch, if completing the colour stimuli version), they should select the “yes” 
option via mouse click.  In contrast, if they did not feel confident they had chosen the most 
densely pixelated patch (or lightest blue patch, if completing the colour stimuli version), they 
should select the “no” option via mouse click.  Participants were given a set of instructions 
outlining the consequences of each choice and informed that, at the end of the task, they had 
the chance to win a prize depending on how many points they gained on the task (in fact, at the 
end of the experiment, all participants received a prize).  Just as for the implicit gambling task, 
17 
 
participants were told that they would start with a balance of 50 points and would win or lose 
points depending on their responses. They were given written and verbal instructions as 
follows: 
 
e) If you click on the patch with most pixels (or lightest blue patch, if completing the colour 
stimuli version) and answer “yes”, you will win 30 points; 
f) If you click on the patch with most pixels (or lightest blue patch) and answer “no”, you will 
win 10 points; 
g) If you click on the patch with fewest pixels (or deepest blue patch) and answer “yes”, you 
will lose 30 points;  
h) If you click on the patch with fewest pixels (or deepest blue patch) and answer “no”, you 
will lose 10 points.    
 
Participants completed 10 practice trials and were then asked whether they understood 
the rules and were given a final chance to ask for clarification before beginning the 
experimental task, but no further information about the nature of the task or the study aims was 
offered.  At this point they were asked to complete the main experimental task, comprising 60 
trials.  The participant’s running total of points was displayed on the bottom left of the computer 
screen throughout the experiment, and updated automatically trial by trial.   
At the end of the task, the participant’s memory for the response rules was tested; the 
experimenter presented the participant with each rule (shown in bullet points e to h above) and 
asked them to complete the points value for each response type. The difference in the 
proportion recalled correctly by participants with ASD (M = .96, SD = .12) and comparison 
participants (M = .97, SD = .08) was statistically small and non-significant, t = 0. 35, p = .73, 
d = 0.10, BF10 = 0.29. 
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Explicit task performance was calculated using the same measures as implicit task 
performance (see above) with four key response measures; 1) object-level sensitivity, 
calculated as d’, 2) object-level response bias, calculated as c, meta-level bias, calculated as 
the proportion of times the “yes” option was selected when asked “Are you confident?”, and 
metacognitive efficiency, calculated as a meta d’ to d’ ratio. As with analysis of the implicit 
gambling task data, metacognitive efficiency is the key variable of interest in the current paper, 
because it provides a measure of metacognitive monitoring accuracy that is unbiased by object-
level performance. 
 
Statistical Power and Analysis  
An alpha level of .05 was used to determine statistical significance. Where t-tests were 
used, we report Cohen’s d values as an index of effect size (≥ 0.20 = small effect, ≥ 0.50 = 
moderate effect; ≥ 0.80 = large effect; Cohen, 1969). Where ANOVAs were used, we report 
partial eta squared (ƞp2) values as an index of effect size (≥ .01 = small effect, ≥ .06 = moderate 
effect, ≥. 14 = large effect; Cohen, 1969). Where correlations are reported, we use Pearson’s r 
as an index of effect size (≥ .01 = small effect r ≥ .30 = moderate effect, ≥. 50 = large effect), 
but note that correlations were not a key focus of the current investigation (see General 
Discussion). 
To estimate the necessary sample size to detect the key results, a power calculation was 
conducted using G*Power3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).  The main aim of 
Experiment 1 was to establish whether judgement-of-confidence accuracy is significantly 
diminished in ASD (which we predicted would be the case) and/or whether gambling accuracy 
is significantly diminished in ASD (which we predicted would not be the case).  However, 
considerations regarding sample size were not straightforward.  First, estimating an effect size 
for group differences in key dependent variables was a challenge.  There is little previous 
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research on metacognitive monitoring in ASD and existing studies have used a variety of tasks 
that are arguably not directly comparable (e.g., Cooper, Plaisted-Grant, Baron-Cohen, & 
Simons; Grainger, Williams, & Lind, 2016a; Grainger, Williams, & Lind, 2016b; Nicholson, 
Williams, Grainger, Lind, & Carruthers, 2019; Williams, Bergstrӧm, & Grainger, 2018; 
Williams, & Happé, 2010, Williams, & Happé, 2009; Wilkinson, Best, Minshew, & Strauss, 
2010; Wojcik, Allen, Brown, & Souchay, 2011; Wojcik, Waterman, Lestie, Moulin, & 
Souchay, 2014), so basing an effect size on the weighted effect size across previous studies 
was inappropriate, in our view.  Second, we predicted a null effect for the between-group 
difference in gambling accuracy, which makes estimating “sufficient power” difficult.  
Therefore, we adopted two approaches.   
First, based on theoretical principles, we estimated that the magnitude of the between-
group difference in judgement-of-confidence accuracy would be equivalent to the magnitude 
of the between-group difference in mindreading task performance (d = 0.88, according to 
Yirmiya et al.’s, 1998, meta-analysis).  Twenty-five participants per group provides power of 
.86, assuming an alpha level of .05 using two-tailed tests (or .96 if using one-tailed tests), which 
meets Cohen’s (1992) criteria for sufficient power.   
Second, we calculated a Bayes factor (BF10) for each key analysis.  Bayesian analyses 
supplement null hypothesis significance testing by providing an estimation of the relative 
strength of a finding for the alternative hypothesis over the null, or vice versa.  This allows a 
more graded interpretation of the data than is possible using p values or effect sizes alone (e.g., 
Dienes, 2014; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009) and is particularly useful for 
interpreting null findings, because it provides an index of the extent to which data supports the 
null over the alternative hypothesis (unlike a non-significant p value, which indicates only that 
we should not be confident the alternative hypothesis is supported).  BF10 values can be 
considered to reflect the probability that the alternative hypothesis is more likely to be true than 
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the null hypothesis.  Hence, a BF10 of 3 suggests the alternative hypothesis is three times more 
likely to be true than the null hypothesis. According to Jeffreys’ (1961) criteria, Bayes factors 
(BF10) > 3 provide firm evidence for the alternative hypothesis (with values > 10, > 30, and 
>100 providing strong, very strong, and decisive evidence, respectively) and values under 1 
provide evidence for the null (with values < 0.33 providing firm evidence).  Bayesian analyses 
were conducted using JASP 0.8.1 (JASP team, 2016).    
 
Experiment 1: Results 
Table 3 shows object level performance (sensitivity and bias), as well as meta-level 
performance (M-ratio scores) among participants from each diagnostic group (ASD/NT) on 
each of the tasks (implicit/explicit) tasks. Meta d’ was calculated separately for implicit task 
performance in the ASD group (M = .91, SD = 84), and NT group (M = 1.03, SD = .71), as 
well as for explicit task performance in the ASD group (M = .88, SD = .74) and NT group (M 
= 1.36, SD = .82). These were then used to calculate metacognitive efficiency as an m-ratio.  
M-ratio scores (meta-d′/d′) were subject to a Group (ASD/TD) × Task (Implicit/Explicit) mixed 
ANOVA (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics), which yielded a non-significant effect of Task 
F(1, 48) = 0.20, p = .66, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .004, and a non-significant effect of Group F(1, 48) = 0.49, p = 
.49, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01.  However, a significant Group × Task interaction was found, F(1, 48) = 4.01, p 
= .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08.  Independent samples t-tests indicated that the M-ratio score was significantly 
diminished among participants with ASD on the explicit task, but not the implicit task. 
Finally, judgment-of-confidence M-ratio score was non-significantly associated with 
implicit gambling M-ratio (r = -.001, p > .99), or with performance on the RMIE mindreading 
task, r = .06, p = .67.  However, judgment-of-confidence M-ratio was associated significantly 
with performance on the Animations mindreading task, when analysed using one-tailed tests 
of significance, r = .24, p < .05.  In contrast, implicit gambling M-ratio was non-significantly 
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associated with either RMIE or Animations mindreading measures, rs <.03, ps > .43.    
 
Experiment 1: Summary 
In keeping with multiple previous findings, we found metacognitive monitoring 
accuracy to be significantly diminished among children/adolescents with ASD on an explicit 
judgement of confidence task.  In contrast, “meta-” level performance on an implicit gambling 
measure was undiminished among participants with ASD.  These findings are in line with our 
predictions that individuals with ASD should have metacognitive impairments, and that 
gambling tasks of the sort used among non-human primates do not necessarily measure 
metacognition, contrary to the claims of many comparative psychologists.   Indeed, meta-level 
performance on the implicit task was not associated significantly with meta-level performance 
on the explicit task, further suggesting that gambling tasks of this kind do not necessarily 
measure metacognition.  Finally, meta-level performance on the explicit task, but not the 
implicit task, was associated significantly with mindreading ability (performance on the 
Animations mindreading task, at least).  We will return to address these associations in the 
General Discussion.  In Experiment 2 we examine the key issues using a dual-task design. 
 
Experiment 2: Method 
Participants 
160 participants (25 male) with a mean age of 19.35 (SD = 2.18) years were recruited from the 
University of Kent in exchange for course credits as part of their degree.  All participants 
provided informed consent and reported no history of ASD. The study was ethically approved 
by the University of Kent, School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee (Ref: 
201715084953804613). 
Materials and Procedures 
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Each participant completed one of the two tasks used in Experiment 1 (implicit gambling or 
explicit judgement of confidence) under one of two conditions (single- or dual-task).   There 
were 40 participants in each condition.  There were no significant differences between 
conditions in terms of participant age, F(1,159) = 1.15, p = .33, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, or gender, χ2 = 2.42, 
p = .49, phi = .12.  Participants who undertook the gambling or judgement-of-confidence task 
under single task conditions also completed the mindreading measures (RMIE & Animations) 
used in Experiment 1 (note that these mindreading measures were not employed among 
participants who completed the dual-task conditions because the dual-task conditions already 
taxed mindreading). One participant who completed the explicit dual-task condition was 
excluded from the results based on being a significant outlier, with an M-ratio score that was 
more than 5.5 standard deviations from the mean). No other participant scored ≥3SD different 
from the mean in any condition. 
The gambling and judgement of confidence tasks were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1, except participants in Experiment 2 received real financial incentives, rather that 
the points for prizes that children/adolescents had won in Experiment 1.  Each point in 
Experiment 1 was equivalent to 1p (pence) in Experiment 2.  Hence, in the judgement-of-
confidence task, for example, if the participant clicked on the patch with most pixels (or lightest 
blue patch) and they selected “yes”, they would win 30p (rather than the 30 points that 
children/adolescents won in Experiment 1). If they chose the patch with most pixels (or lightest 
blue patch) and they selected “no”, they would win 10p (rather than the 10 points that children 
won in Experiment 1).  And so forth.  Participants began with a balance of £2.00 and were told 
that they would win or lose money based on their responses on each trial. The gambling and 
judgement-of-confidence payment rules were the same regardless of whether participants 
completed them under single or dual-task conditions.  Participants who completed one of the 
tasks under dual-task conditions also completed an auditory mindreading task concurrently and 
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received financial incentives for that secondary task also.  
For the auditory mindreading task, participants heard via headphones a collection of 
auditory stimuli taken from the Cambridge Mindreading Voice battery (Golan, Baron-Cohen 
& Hill, 2006). These are a series of 50 short phrases, spoken by professional actors and ranging 
from 2-3 seconds in length, projecting different emotional and mental states. At the start of a 
dual task trial, a phrase was presented, followed by two mental state words, the target mental 
state and a foil. Mental state words were presented in sequence, the first 1 second after the end 
of the mental state phrase (mental state option 1), and then the other 1 second later (mental 
state option 2). The order in which targets and foils were presented was counterbalanced across 
clips. For example, on one trial, participants heard the phrase “That’s not what I was told”, 
followed by the words “Uneasy” (correct response) and “Provoked” (foil response).  In another 
trial, participants heard the phrase, “That is horrible,” followed by the words “Disturbed” (foil 
response) and “Appalled” (correct response).  The participant’s task was to repeat the word 
that they judged to reflect the mental state of the speaker of the phrase. They had 3 seconds to 
respond on each trial before the next one began. The auditory stimuli were presented 
throughout the gambling or judgement of confidence tasks (in a fixed order). Participants were 
informed that for every correct response on the secondary mindreading task, they would win 
30p; for every incorrect response they would lose 30p, and if they failed to respond on a given 
trial, they would lose 30p.  All participants performed above chance (>.50) in each condition 
on the secondary mindreading task (M = .79, SD = .14 in the implicit condition and M = .77, 
SD = .09 in the explicit condition) and, thus, none was excluded for failure to engage in the 
secondary task.   Explicit feedback, on a trial-by-trial basis on the secondary task was not 
provided, and participants were told at the end of the task what their reward was for 
performance on the dual task. 
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Participants began with a practice task, which was split into three parts. In the first part, 
they completed 10 trials of the primary gambling or judgement-of-confidence task alone 
(identical to the practice task completed by participants in the single-task condition). In the 
second part, they completed 5 trials of the secondary mindreading task alone.  In the final part, 
they practiced both the primary and secondary tasks together across 10 trials of the primary 
task.   
 
Statistical Power and Analysis  
A power calculation using G*Power3 (Faul et al., 2009) revealed that, to detect a between-
condition (single/dual) difference in judgement-of-confidence accuracy of d = 0.88, on 80% of 
occasions (Cohen, 1992) using two-tailed tests, 22 participants per condition were required.  
Bayesian analyses were also conducted to enable interpretation of the between-condition 
difference in gambling accuracy (which we predicted would be null).     
 
Experiment 2: Results 
Table 4 shows object level performance (sensitivity and bias), as well as meta-level 
performance (M-ratio scores) among participants in each condition (Single/dual) on each of 
the tasks (implicit gambling/explicit judgement of confidence) tasks.  Meta d’ was calculated 
separately for implicit task performance in the single-task condition (M =1.38, SD = 95) and 
dual-task condition (M = 1.33, SD = .95), as well as for explicit task performance in the single-
task condition (M =1.76, SD = 76) and dual-task condition (M = 1.13, SD = 1.05).  These were 
then used to calculate the key measure of metacognitive efficiency as an m-ratio. M-ratio scores 
(meta-d′/d′) were subject to a Condition (Single/dual) × Task (implicit gambling/explicit 
judgement of confidence) ANOVA, which yielded a non-significant effect of Task F(1, 155) 
= 2.16, p = .14, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01.  The effect of Condition was significant, F(1, 155) = 8.27, p = .005, 
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𝜂𝑝
2 = .05, as was the Task × Condition interaction, F(1, 155) = 4.33, p = .03, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03.   
Independent samples t-tests indicated that, on the explicit judgement of confidence task, the 
M-ratio score was significantly lower in the dual-task condition than in the single-task 
condition.  On the implicit gambling task, however, the M-ratio score did not differ 
significantly across conditions (see Table 4). 
 Correlation analyses revealed that judgment-of-confidence M-ratio score was non-
significantly associated with performance on the RMIE mindreading task, r = -.15, p = .34, but 
was associated significantly with performance on the Animations mindreading task, when 
analysed using one-tailed tests of significance, r = .26, p = .05.  In contrast, implicit gambling 
M-ratio was non-significantly associated with either RMIE or Animations mindreading 
measures, rs < -.25, ps > .12.    
 
Experiment 2: Summary 
In line with predictions, concurrent completion of a secondary mindreading task impaired 
metacognitive monitoring accuracy among neurotypical adults on a judgement of confidence 
task.  In contrast, concurrent completion of this secondary mindreading task did not diminish 
“meta”-level performance on an implicit gambling measure of the sort claimed to assess 
metacognitive monitoring among non-human primates.  These results mirror and complement 
those found in Experiment 1, in which a group of people with mindreading impairments (i.e., 
those with ASD) showed diminished meta-level performance on the explicit judgement of 
confidence task, but not the implicit gambling task.   
 It is clear from the results in Experiment 2 (as well as Experiment 1) that implicit 
gambling accuracy cannot rely on mindreading resources in the same way that explicit 
judgement-of-confidence accuracy appears to, given that only the latter was detrimentally 
affected by concurrent completion of a secondary task that tapped mindreading.  However, 
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there is a possibility that the detrimental effect of secondary-task completion on judgement-
of-confidence accuracy in Experiment 2 was not because the tasks shared a common 
metarepresentational processing resource.  Rather, it could be that concurrent completion of 
any secondary task, regardless of the processing resources tapped by the secondary task, 
would detrimentally affect judgement-of-confidence accuracy.  In other words, it might be 
that metacognition is disrupted by imposition of any additional cognitive load (a general 
dual-task effect), rather than by imposition of additional metarepresentational load 
specifically (a specific dual-task effect).  To address this, we devised two additional dual-task 
conditions and had new groups of neurotypical participants complete the judgement-of-
confidence task under one of these conditions (n = 31 per condition).  We then compared 
judgement-of-confidence accuracy in the single- and standard dual-task conditions (reported 
above) with judgement-of-confidence accuracy in each of these additional dual-task 
conditions.  
In one condition (gender, sentence forwards condition), participants listened to the same 
auditory stimuli (from the Cambridge Mindreading Voice battery) that participants in the 
standard dual-task condition completed in Experiment 2, but judged the gender of the speaker 
(male/female) rather than the thought/emotion the speaker was experiencing.  In this condition, 
even though the task was to judge the gender of the speaker, we thought it was possible that 
the thought/emotion the speaker was experiencing could be processed automatically.  If the 
thought/emotion of the speaker was processed automatically, even though it wasn’t the goal of 
the task, then performing this secondary task concurrently with the explicit judgement of 
confidence task might reduce metacognitive efficiency (because, according to our predictions, 
both tasks depend on mindreading).  Therefore, we designed a second control condition to rule 
out the possibility of automatic activation of the mindreading system during task completion.  
In this second control condition (gender, sentence backwards), the stimuli from the Cambridge 
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Mindreading Voice battery task were re-recorded by adult males and females who used neutral 
intonation.  However, it was not only the intonation of the voices in the Cambridge 
Mindreading Voice battery task that indicated the thoughts/emotions experienced by the 
speaker, but also the content of the sentences themselves.  Therefore, to rule out automatic 
inference of mental states in this gender, backwards condition, the sentences were spoken in 
reverse (e.g., “I’ve been waiting so long for this moment” became “moment this for long so 
waiting been I’ve”).  Again, participants were tasked with judging the gender of the speaker, 
but we reasoned that mindreading would be (near-) impossible in this condition..    
 
Experiment 3: Method 
Participants.  Thirty-one participants (4 male) completed the judgement of 
confidence task alongside the Gender forward sentences dual-task and 31 participants (10 
male) completed the judgement of confidence task alongside the Gender backwards sentences 
dual-task.  The average age of participants who completed the Gender forward sentences 
dual-task condition was 23.48 years (SD= 5.23).  The average age of participants who 
completed the Gender backward sentences dual-task condition was 23.10 years (SD = 6.64).  
All participants were recruited from the University of Kent, in exchange for course credits as 
part of their degree or payment, and from the local community. No participant had a history 
of ASD, according to self-report.  All participants provided informed consent and the study 
was ethically approved by the University of Kent, School of Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee, 201715084953804613. 
Materials and Procedures.  In Experiment 3, participants completed the same 
judgement of confidence task used in Experiment 2, but concurrently with one of two new 
secondary tasks.  The first new task was a “gender, forward sentences” secondary task was 
identical to the secondary task used in Experiment 2 except in one respect.  In this new 
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secondary task, after the presentation of each sentence from the Cambridge Mindreading 
Voice Battery (Golan, Baron-Cohen & Hill, 2006), participants heard the words “male” and 
“female” and had to report verbally which sex the speaker of the sentence had been.  Of the 
40 stimuli used in the experiment, 24 were spoken by a male actor and 16 were spoken by a 
female actor. The payment rules for this secondary task were the same as for the secondary 
task in Experiment 2; for each correct gender judgement, participants won 30p, for each 
incorrect judgement participants lost 30p, and if they failed to respond they lost 30p. All 
other procedures, including the judgement-of-confidence task, practice procedure, and 
payment rules, were identical to those outlined in Experiment 2.  One participant was 
excluded from the results based on being a significant outlier, with an M-ratio score that was 
more than 5.5 standard deviations different from the mean). No other participant scored 
≥3SD different from the mean in any condition. 
The second new task was a “gender, backward sentences” secondary task.  For this 
new task, the auditory stimuli from the Cambridge Mindreading Voice Battery (Golan, 
Baron-Cohen & Hill, 2006) was re-recorded by 3 female and 3 male actors using a neutral 
voice. As the actors removed any intonation, emphasis and emotion from their voice any 
mental states automatically associated with the speech would be reduced. In order to also rule 
out any possibility of automatic mindreading, actors spoke each sentence backwards in order 
to minimise emotional content of the sentences. So, for example, “He never helps at home” 
was recorded as “home at helps never he”.  Participants heard these new sentences and after 
each heard the options “male” and “female”. Their task was to identify the gender of the 
speaker for each sentence by verbally reporting one of the two genders. All other aspects of 
the task were identical to those employed in the gender, forward dual-task. All participants 
performed above chance (>.50) in each of the secondary tasks and, thus, none was excluded 
for failure to engage in the secondary task. 
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Experiment 3: Results 
Meta d’ was calculated for performance in the gender forward dual-task condition (M 
= 1.14, SD = .77) and the gender backwards dual-task condition (M = 1.43, SD = .83). Means 
and standard deviations for each dependent variable for the judgement-of-confidence task in 
each of the supplementary dual-task conditions are reported in Table 5.  Independent t-tests 
revealed no significant effects between conditions in any of the variables.  Next, we 
compared judgement-of-confidence performance in each of these control conditions with 
judgement-of-confidence performance in each of the single- and dual-task conditions 
completed by participants in Experiment 2.  An initial series of ANOVAs revealed a 
significant effect of condition (single-/dual-mindreading/dual-gender forward sentences/dual-
gender-backward) on M-ratio, F(3, 136) = 3.94, p = .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08, but not object-level 
sensitivity, F(3, 136) = 0.32, p = .81, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .007, or object-level bias, F(3, 136) = 1.89, p = .13, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .04.  Independent-samples t-tests revealed that M-ratio in the single task condition (from 
Experiment 2) was non-significantly different from M-ratio in either the dual-gender-forward 
sentences condition, t(68) = 1.15, p = .25, d = 0.28, BF10 = 0.44, or the dual-gender-backward 
sentences condition, t(69) = 0.39, p = .70, d = 0.09, BF10 = 0.26.  In other words, 
metacognitive monitoring accuracy was non-significantly affected by completion of either of 
the control dual-task conditions.  In contrast, M-ratio, in the dual-mindreading task condition 
(from Experiment 2) was significantly lower than in either the dual-gender-forwards 
sentences condition, t(68) = 2.03, p = .05, d = 0.49, BF10 = 1.41, or the dual-gender-
backwards sentences condition, t(68) = 2.56, p = .01, d = 0.62, BF10 = 3.81.   
Experiment 3: Summary 
In Experiment 3, we designed two control dual-task conditions, a gender forward-sentences 
condition and a gender backward-sentences condition.  Participants completed the explicit 
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judgement-of-confidence task under one of these two control conditions.  The aim was to 
show that completing an explicit metacognitive task alongside a secondary task that did not 
require mindreading would not have a significant detrimental effect on metacognitive 
accuracy.  This is what we found.  Metacognitive monitoring accuracy on the primary 
judgement-of-confidence task was non-significantly affected by completion of either of the 
control dual-task conditions (reported in Experiment 3), relative to performance in the single-
task condition (reported in Experiment 2).  Indeed, the only dual-task condition to 
significantly negatively influence judgement-of-confidence accuracy was the mindreading 
dual-task condition reported in Experiment 2.  Judgement-of-confidence accuracy was 
significantly lower in the mindreading dual-task condition than in any of the other three 
conditions (single-task, dual-task forward-sentences, dual-task backward-sentences).  This 
suggests that it is mindreading specifically that is linked to metacognitive monitoring and that 
taking up the resources required for the former has a negative effect on the latter, in keeping 
with our predictions.    
General Discussion 
Across three experiments, we found consistent evidence in support of our key 
hypotheses.  To elaborate, with regard to our first question about whether metacognition and 
mindreading share the same metarepresentational resources (the one-system view), we found 
that judgement-of-confidence accuracy was significantly diminished in ASD, indicating that 
metacognition is impaired in this disorder.  Thus, contrary to the claims of some that 
metacognition is unimpaired whereas mindreading is diminished in ASD, we found no 
evidence of a dissociation between metacognition and mindreading among participants with 
ASD.  This finding is in keeping with the prediction made by one-system views of the relation 
between metacognition and mindreading, and complements data obtained using other methods 
(Nicholson, Williams, Grainger, Lind, & Carruthers, 2019).   
31 
 
Of course, it is possible that ASD involves a “double hit” of impairments that disrupt 
both metacognition and mindreading.  Such a finding alone would be clinically important, but 
wouldn’t necessarily count against two-systems or metacognition-is-prior views.  However, if 
the mindreading and metacognitive impairments in ASD were the result of a double hit of 
independent impairments, rather than as a result of a single metarepresentational faculty that 
processes mental states in others and self, then there is no reason to suppose that taking up 
mindreading resources in a dual-task paradigm would disrupt metacognition among 
neurotypical individuals.  Yet, in Experiment 2, we found judgement-of-confidence accuracy 
was selectively impaired by concurrent performance on a secondary mindreading task.  This 
suggests that the primary metacognition and secondary mindreading tasks were competing for 
metarepresentational resources in a way that is predicted only by one-system theories.   
However, there is also the theoretical possibility—mentioned, but set aside, in the 
introduction—of a version of metacognition-is-prior view that claims a damaged metacognitive 
system is the primary cause of mindreading deficits in ASD. While to the best of our knowledge 
no one has proposed such a view, it is a possible view, and nothing in the experiments 
conducted here rules it out. 
It likewise remains possible that the reduced metacognitive performance among 
participants with ASD in the explicit (but not implicit) metacognition task was caused by 
something other than reduced mindreading. The implicit and explicit tasks also differ in the 
demands they make on linguistic ability, for example. While we cannot exclude the possibility 
that there is some factor other than mindreading that explains the differential performance in 
ASD, it is unlikely to be a difference in linguistic abilities, since these were closely matched 
with the control group. 
Turning now to Experiments 2 and 3, it is important to highlight that none of the task 
variables other than metacognitive accuracy was affected by concurrent performance on the 
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secondary mindreading task.  Hence, it is not the case that merely performing a secondary task 
disrupts primary task performance per se.  Rather, it was metacognitive accuracy that was 
selectively diminished by concurrent mindreading (and continued to be diminished even after 
the influence of all other task variables was controlled). Finally, the detrimental effect on 
judgement-of-confidence metacognitive accuracy of concurrent completion of a secondary task 
appeared to be specific to when the secondary task involved mindreading (in Experiment 2).  
When the judgement of confidence task was completed alongside a dual-task that did not 
demand mindreading (in Experiment 3), then metacognitive accuracy was equivalent to that in 
the single-task condition reported above.  Thus, it was not the case that concurrent completion 
of any secondary task disrupted metacognitive accuracy, but rather that metacognitive accuracy 
was detrimentally affected when metarepresentational processing resources were taxed by the 
secondary task.  While this result is consistent with our one-system view, taken on its own it is 
also consistent with a metacognition-is-prior account. 
We were unable to control for all possible differences between the dual-tasks employed 
in experiments 2 and 3, of course. It may be that judging emotion from speech in order to make 
binary selections among candidate emotion words, where the candidates vary from trial to trial 
(Experiment 2), is inherently more difficult than making repeated binary judgments of gender 
(Experiment 3). Perhaps the former task is more demanding of attention and/or working 
memory. If that were the case, then it may be that this additional load, rather than a specific 
drain on mindreading resources, interfered with the explicit judgement-of-confidence task. 
Future studies might explore this possibility further. 
In keeping with our predictions, meta-level performance on the explicit judgement of 
confidence task was associated significantly (using one-tailed tests of significance) with 
performance on the Animations measure of mindreading in both experiments 1 and 2, which 
replicates the finding of Nicholson et al. (2019) who observed a similar sized association 
33 
 
between judgement of confidence accuracy and Animations task performance (r = .35 in their 
study).   
One issue to address, however, is the fact that RMIE mindreading task performance 
was not associated significantly with judgement-of-confidence accuracy in either Experiment 
1 or 2, contrary to our predictions and to the findings of Williams et al. (2018) and Nicholson 
et al. (2019).  We do not have a concrete explanation for the non-significant association 
between judgement of confidence accuracy and mindreading in the current study.  However, 
we note that an investigation into the correlations between mindreading and metacognition was 
not a key aim of the current study and we were aware that the study was not sufficiently 
powered to detect the association predicted by one-system theorists (note that replication 
studies likely require between 2.5 and 3.5 times the sample size of the original studies; e.g., 
Simonsohn, 2015; 2016).  There is now a clear pattern emerging across studies that indicate a 
consistently modest, but reliable, association between metacognition and mindreading.  
Significant associations between judgement of confidence accuracy and RMIE task 
performance have been observed in independent samples by Williams et al. (2018, r = .25), 
Nicholson et al. (2019, r = .26), and Carpenter & Williams (under review, r = .26).  To detect 
a correlation of .26 on 80% of occasions, a sample of 90 participants is required even when 
using one-tailed tests.  Therefore, we were aware that our samples of N = 50 in Experiment 1 
and N = 40 in Experiment 2 were not sufficiently powered to detect even predicted associations, 
which we acknowledge as a limitation.  Nonetheless, it is reassuring that the significant 
associations we observed between judgement of confidence accuracy and Animations task 
performance was of an almost-identical magnitude in both experiments 1 (r = .24) and 2 (r = 
.26) as observed in the few previous studies that have explored the relation between 
mindreading and metacognition.     
In sum, we found converging evidence from three experiments that when mindreading 
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resources are diminished (either clinically in ASD or artificially in neurotypical people when 
performing a dual task), so too are metacognitive resources.  The overall pattern of these 
findings would not be predicted by either two-systems or metacognition-is-prior theorists, and 
nor can it be explained straightforwardly by either of those theories.  Rather, the results support 
one-system views of the relation between mindreading and metacognition.   
Turning to our second question, regarding whether implicit gambling tasks of the sort 
that have been claimed to measure metacognition in non-human primates necessarily require 
metarepresentation, we also found consistent evidence for our predictions from findings in 
Experiments 1 and 2.  In Experiment 1, our sample of ASD participants showed impairments 
in metarepresenting self (judgement-of-confidence accuracy) and others (Animations), yet still 
performed equivalently to the neurotypical comparison group in terms of gambling accuracy.  
These findings suggest that gambling tasks of the sort used among non-human primates do not 
necessarily require metarepresentation (nor do they seem to involve such metarepresentation 
in humans who undertake them), but can be achieved using first-order risk-based affective 
appraisals of likely success.   
Again, converging results were observed in Experiment 2.  Whereas judgement-of-
confidence accuracy was consistently and selectively impoverished by the imposition of a 
secondary mindreading task, gambling accuracy (despite having an almost identical task 
structure to the judgement-of-confidence task) was not.  The between-condition difference in 
gambling accuracy was small, non-significant, and associated with a Bayes Factor that 
supported the null hypothesis. This shows that, even when metarepresentational resources are 
taxed (by the secondary mindreading task), gambling is as accurate as when 
metarepresentational resources are not taxed at all (in the single-task condition).   
In addition, across both Experiments 1 and 2, performance on the implicit and explicit 
tasks was uncorrelated. This result speaks against the view that implicit gambling tasks of the 
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sort used to measure metacognitive processes in monkeys are actually doing so. For even 
though the implicit and explicit tasks differ along a number of dimensions, if both tap into 
metacognitive abilities, then performance in each should be significantly correlated with the 
other. This finding complements the finding by Nicholson et al. (2019) that implicit and explicit 
performance on another of the tasks used to measure metacognition in monkeys—namely, so-
called “uncertainty monitoring” tasks—is likewise uncorrelated. Specifically, in Nicholson et 
al. (2019), a group of adults with ASD and a matched control group of neurotypical adults 
completed a classic explicit metacognitive task, similar to the explicit task used in the current 
study, as well an implicit (“strategic opt-out”) measure that was different to the gambling 
paradigm used in the current study.  The implicit task involved making perceptual 
discriminations, with success resulting in financial reward and failure resulting in financial 
penalty.  The crucial feature of this paradigm is that participants could choose to opt-out of any 
given trial, and avoid penalty or reward on that trial.  This kind of paradigm is used frequently 
among non-human primates, with adaptive use of the opt-out option on difficult trials taken to 
indicate that the participant metarepresents their own state of uncertainty when faced with a 
challenging trial and behaves accordingly.  Yet, Nicholson et al. found that participants with 
ASD made adaptive use of the opt-out option to the same extent as neurotypical participants, 
despite showing significant impairments in explicit metacognitive accuracy and mindreading 
accuracy (with performance on the latter two tasks correlated significantly, despite neither 
being correlated with strategic opting out).  Just as in the current study, therefore, Nicholson et 
al. observed a dissociation between performance on classic metacognitive tasks and tasks of 
the sort that are claimed to reveal metacognition in non-human primates.  This calls into 
question whether such implicit tasks are really require metarepresentation of one’s own internal 
states for successful performance.  It remains possible, however, that metacognitive abilities 
fractionate along a number of different dimensions, with one subset of abilities being accessed 
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by our implicit tasks, and another subset utilized in the explicit tasks. This, too, could explain 
the lack of correlation.   
Even if it were true that humans fail to metarepresent their own states when they gamble 
accurately in our implicit tasks, it may be that non-human primates nevertheless do so. 
However, our results suggest that one should use caution when interpreting the gambling 
performance of non-humans.  If humans, a species we know to be capable of accurate 
metacognition, do not need to metarepresent their own states to gamble accurately, then we 
should arguably be skeptical of claims that non-humans do need to metarepresent their states 
on such tasks.  Moreover, if implicit tasks of the sort successfully employed with monkeys are 
not genuinely metacognitive in nature, then one important strand of support for metacognition-
is-prior accounts is undercut. 
In sum, the current study has significant implications for both theory development and 
clinical practice. Taken together, our findings are in keeping with only one of the theories 
considered, which is striking given that several predictions overlap across theories, 
highlighting how challenging it is to distinguish them empirically. The findings suggest, on the 
one hand, that implicit gambling paradigms of the sort used to test “metacognition” in non-
human animals do not, in fact, measure awareness of one’s own mental states (not in humans, 
at any rate). On the other hand, the results suggest that accuracy of explicit metacognitive 
judgements about one’s own mental states depends to a significant extent on mindreading 
ability. As a result, people with ASD, who have established mindreading difficulties, also show 
significantly weaker performance on explicit metacognitive tasks (but not implicit gambling 
tasks). 
 
Context of Research 
This work had its roots in two suggestions made by Carruthers (2009, 2011) on theoretical 
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grounds. The first was that the same faculty underlies both mindreading of others and 
metacognition of self.  This view was shared by Williams (e.g., 2010; see also, Williams, Lind, 
& Happé’s commentary on Carruthers, 2009), and endorsed by him as an explanation for key 
difficulties in both other- and self-awareness experienced by many people with ASD. The 
second suggestion was that so-called nonverbal “metacognitive” tasks employed with 
nonhuman animals are not genuinely metacognitive in nature. This led to discussions about 
how best to test these theoretical predictions, resulting in Nicholson et al. (2019) and the present 
study. Future work may extend the framework to employ other methods, or to test other types 
of alleged implicit metacognition. 
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Table 1: Predictions Following from each Theory  
  
Prediction 
 
Theory 
ASD implicit task performance 
is impaired 
ASD explicit task performance 
is impaired 
Implicit task correlates with 
explicit task  
Secondary mindreading task 
selectively affects explicit only 
Secondary mindreading task 
affects implicit and explicit tasks  
Two-systems & 
implicit tasks are 
metarepresentational 
 
No: because metacognition is 
not impaired and implicit task 
does not require mindreading 
system 
No: because metacognition is 
not impaired and explicit task 
would not require mindreading 
system 
Yes: because both implicit 
and explicit tasks should rely 
on the same metacognitive 
system 
No: because mindreading is 
distinct from metacognition, 
leaving both tasks unaffected 
No: because mindreading is 
distinct from metacognition, 
leaving both tasks unaffected 
Metacognition-is-prior 
& implicit tasks are 
metarepresentational* 
No: because metacognition is 
not predicted to be impaired 
and implicit task would not 
require mindreading system 
No: because metacognition is 
not predicted to be impaired 
and explicit task would not 
require mindreading system 
Yes: because both implicit 
and explicit tasks should rely 
on the same metacognitive 
system 
No: because mindreading 
depends on metacognition, so 
both tasks are affected by 
interference with mindreading 
Yes: because mindreading 
depends on metacognition, so 
both tasks are affected by 
interference with mindreading 
One-system & implicit 
tasks are 
metarepresentational 
 
Yes: because with one system, 
metarepresentation in general 
is impaired in ASD 
Yes: because with one system, 
metarepresentation in general 
is impaired in ASD 
Yes: because both implicit 
and explicit tasks should rely 
on the same metacognitive 
system 
No: because both implicit and 
explicit tasks require the same 
metarepresentational system as 
mindreading 
Yes: because both implicit and 
explicit tasks require the same 
metarepresentational system as 
mindreading 
Two-systems & 
implicit tasks are not 
metarepresentational 
 
No: because damage to 
mindreading should not lead to 
deficits in a first-order task 
No: because damage to 
mindreading leaves 
metacognitive system intact 
No: because implicit tasks are 
not metarepresentational, 
whereas explicit tasks are 
No: because mindreading is 
distinct from metacognition and 
is not required for a first-order 
task, so both tasks unaffected 
No: because mindreading is 
distinct from metacognition and 
is not required for a first-order 
task, so both tasks unaffected 
Metacognition-is-prior 
& implicit tasks are not 
metarepresentational* 
No: because damage to 
mindreading should not lead to 
deficits in a first-order task 
No: because metacognition is 
not predicted to be impaired 
and explicit task would not 
require mindreading system 
No: because implicit tasks are 
not metarepresentational, 
whereas explicit tasks are 
Yes: because mindreading 
depends on metacognition and 
only the explicit task is 
metacognitive 
No: because mindreading 
depends on metacognition and 
only the explicit task is 
metacognitive 
One-system & implicit 
tasks are not 
metarepresentational 
 
No: because damage to 
mindreading should not lead to 
deficits in a first-order task 
Yes: because explicit task 
shares metarepresentational 
system with mindreading 
which is impaired in ASD 
No: because implicit tasks are 
not metarepresentational, 
whereas explicit tasks are  
Yes: because only the explicit 
task involves the mindreading 
system, so only the explicit task 
is affected 
No: because only the explicit 
task involves the mindreading 
system, so only the explicit task 
is affected 
*Note that the metacognition-is-prior view represented here is the version actually defended by theorists in the literature, according to which metacognition 
should not be damaged in ASD. Another possible version of metacognition-is-prior view, according to which metacognitive deficits lie at the base of the well-
known mindreading difficulties in ASD, is not addressed in these experiments, nor in our discussion (except in passing).
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Table 2  
Experiment 1 Participant Characteristics and Group Matching Statistics  
 ASD (n = 25) NT (n = 25) t p d 
Age 12.71 (1.52) 13.17  (1.54) 1.07  .29 0.30 
VIQ 105.92 (9.90) 109.20 (10.82) 1.12  .27 0.32 
PIQ 109.36 (13.04) 113.56 (13.91) 1.10  .28 0.31 
SRS T-score 84.75 (9.45) 45.88 (10.47) 13.62 <.001 3.90 
RMIE proportion correcta .69 (.08) .73 (10) 1.42 .08 0.41 
Animations proportion correct .46 (.24) .70 (.18) 4.01 <.001 1.14 
a. One participant with ASD became distressed when completing this task and so data was collected 
from only 24 participants 
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Table 3  
Object-level and meta-level performance on the Gambling and Judgement of Confidence Task, in Autistic and Neurotypical Participants (Experiment 
1)  
Task Variable Group t p d BF10 
  ASD  NT     
Gambling  Object-level: Sensitivity (d′) 0.99 (0.54) 1.00 (0.59) 0.11 .92 0.03 0.29 
 Object-level: Criterion/bias (c)  -.32 (.61) -.07 (.57) 1.47 .15   
 Meta-level: M-Ratio 1.04 (1.21) .60 (2.66) 0.76 .45 0.45 0.36 
Judgement of confidence Object-level: Sensitivity (d′) 1.00 (0.60) 1.02 (0.60) 0.11 0.91 0.03 0.29 
 Object-level: Criterion/bias (c)  -.22 (.33) -.13 (.57) .65 .52   
 Meta-level: M-Ratio .51 (1.74) 1.45 (0.99) 2.37 .01 0.67 5.21 
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Table 4 
Gambling and Judgement of Confidence Task Performance in the Single and Dual Task Condition (Experiment 2) 
Task Variable Condition t p d BF10 
  Single-task  Dual-task     
Gambling  Object-level: Sensitivity (d′) 1.21 (0.68) 1.23 (0.50) 0.16 .87 0.04 0.23 
 Object-level: Criterion/bias (c)  .02 (.51) .06 (.59) 0.32 .75 0.07 0.24 
 Meta-level: M-Ratio 1.33 (1.21) 1.08 (0.87) 1.08 .28 0.24 0.39 
Judgement of confidence Object-level: Sensitivity (d′) 1.31 (0.59) 1.27(.74) 0.25 .80 0.06 0.24 
 Object-level: Criterion/bias (c)  -.31 (.51) .07 (1.15)  1.94 .06 0.43 1.17 
 Meta-level: M-Ratio 1.52 (2.20) 0.02 (3.98) 2.50 .01 0.47 3.34 
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Table 5  
Mean (SD) Performance on each variable of the judgement-of-confidence task in each of the dual-task conditions in Experiment 3 
Variable Condition t p d BF10 
 Dual, Gender 
forwards 
Dual, Gender 
backwards  
    
Object-level: Sensitivity (d′) 1.23 (0.68 1.16 (0.53) 0.40 .69 0.10 0.28 
Object-level: Criterion/bias (c)  -.24 (.48) -.44 (1.37) 0.74 .46 0.19 0.33 
Meta-level: M-Ratio 1.02 (1.06) 1.73 (2.36) 1.52 .14 0.39 0.68 
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Figure 1a.  Details of the Procedure for the Implicit (Gambling) Task  
 
Figure 1a.   Schematic representation of one trial of the implicit gambling task (pixel version) from experiment 1. For the object-level component of each 
trial, participants either completed the colour or pixel version.  In the pixel version, participants had to click on the patch which had the most number of 
pixels (here the correct answer is the right patch). For the “meta”-level component, participants were presented with a triangle and a circle, and asked 
to click on one of these. After selecting a shape, participants received feedback based on the accuracy (object-level) and which shape they chose (meta-
level), as displayed on the far right of the image (in this example, the participant has lost 10 points because they selected the circle (low risk option) 
having made an incorrect object-level perceptual judgment).  Participants had 3 seconds to make each of their selections and if the failed to do so for 
either the object or “meta” level, they received miss feedback.  Participants began with 50 points which was displayed on the bottom right of the screen 
and this value updated on each trial based on their feedback, giving participants on ongoing awareness of their score.  
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Figure 1b.  Details of the Procedure for the Explicit (Judgment of Confidence) Task  
 
Figure 1b.  Schematic representation of one trial of the explicit judgement of confidence task (colour version).  For the object-level component, if 
participants had completed the pixel version of the implicit task, they would complete the colour version for the explicit task and vice versa. This 
time after making their object-level selection, they were asked “Are you confident?”  and could select “Yes” or “No”.   Participants then received 
feedback based on their selections at the end of each trial. Participants had 3s to make each of their selections and if the failed to respond to 
either the object or meta level decision within this time they received miss feedback. Once again in both task,s participants began with 50 points 
which was displayed on the bottom right of the screen and this value updated on each trial based on their feedback, giving participants on ongoing 
awareness of their score. 
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